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CHAPTER 10
Public Sector Job Creation
A Review of Past Experience 
and Its Relevance to the Future
William Grinker
The notion of using the public sector for job creation is, to put it 
mildly, not a popular idea these days. When President Clinton intro 
duced his economic stimulus and deficit reduction package in early 
1993, the modest public sector job creation effort called for in the pub 
lic works portion of the package was unceremoniously shot down as a 
needless government pork barrel. The potential for major welfare 
reform under the Clinton plan of "two years and out" was thwarted by 
the specter of a large-scale government public job creation effort to get 
people off welfare. More recent plans for restricting welfare under the 
Republicans' "Contract With America" have avoided the jobs problems 
entirely by simply dictating that the states will be free to take care of 
the problem within a five-year time limitation. While both friends and 
foes of the North American Free Trade Agreement and other free trade 
initiatives recognized the serious potential for worker displacement, 
very few took seriously the idea of government-created jobs as part of 
an alternative, concentrating instead on support for retraining and relo 
cation schemes.
There are exceptions, of course, such as Senator Paul Simon of Illi 
nois who advocated a large-scale public jobs creation program to deal 
with both structural and cyclical employment issues as part of his abor 
tive presidential bid in 1988. (See, Let's Put America Back to Work, 
Paul Simon, 1988; see also Remarks of Senator David Boren, Congres 
sional Record; January 27, 1993.) But to this point, their views have 
not entered the mainstream of public debate about the future of the 
American workforce.
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In part, this lack of serious consideration for public sector job 
creation either as a tool for redressing long-term structural 
unemployment or as a shorter-term response to cyclical economic 
problems, no doubt reflects a general distrust of government's ability to 
solve problems. And the fact that, unlike many other employment and 
training or social interventions, very little analytic attention has been 
paid to public sector job creation, leaves the public and policy makers 
alike prey to the perception often encouraged by political 
leadership that government work is essentially nonproductive. 
Finally, compounding this distrust and lack of information is the strong 
residue of the concerted effort by neo-conservatives in the 1970s to 
paint public sector job creation specifically as a gigantic boondoggle. 
Thus, by the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, to paraphrase an oft- 
repeated Fortune Magazine article of the late 1970s, Public Service 
Job Creation (sic CETA) had become a "dirty word." The perception of 
incompetence and ineffectiveness, despite strong evidence to the 
contrary, enabled the Reagan administration quickly to dismantle the 
existing public sector employment program. And the idea of 
resurrecting it in some form to deal with today's exacerbated worker 
displacement and increasingly difficult structural employment issues, 
where the prospects of going down below a 5.5 percent unemployment 
rate creates great trepidation in the financial markets, is not seriously 
considered.
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the primary experiences 
that have led to this state of affairs, and to ascertain whether there are 
lessons that can be applied to the future. The two most prominent gov 
ernment initiatives aimed at curbing unemployment through federally 
subsidized job creation programs were the Works Progress Administra 
tion (WPA) introduced during the Great Depression and the Public Ser 
vice Employment program (PSE), the major job creation program 
inaugurated under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA) in the 1970s.
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The WPA
The WPA was the biggest and best known of Franklin Roosevelt's 
New Deal programs. Begun with funds appropriated under the Emer 
gency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, the WPA went on to employ 
over eight million people in its six-year history. The WPA, however, 
was not the first job creation project launched under the New Deal. It 
grew primarily out of two previous job creation efforts, the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act (FERA) and the Civil Works Administration 
(CWA). An examination of how FERA and CWA merged to form the 
WPA provides some interesting insights into many of the problems and 
policy issues facing any federally subsidized employment program.
Chronicled in Irving Bernstein's 1985 book, A Caring Society: The 
New Deal, the Worker, and the Great Depression, the forging of the 
WPA was a political battle in which powerful opposing ideologies 
were pitted against one another. On the one hand, Harold Ickes, head of 
the CWA, focused on improving the nation's infrastructure through 
physical projects that could be constructed through federally subsi 
dized employment. Ickes believed that bridges, roads, dams, and other 
projects should be the backbone of any federally designed public 
employment policy. This approach stressed the need for a long-term 
federally subsidized effort that would stimulate the economy by 
increasing government spending on goods and materials needed for 
large-scale infrastructure building projects. On the opposing side, 
Harry Hopkins, at the time the head of FERA, was concerned primarily 
with creating jobs quickly. He considered large-scale public works 
projects as unnecessarily costly and not well suited to a comprehensive 
employment mobilization effort. He stressed stimulating the economy 
by boosting consumer purchasing power and an overall strengthening 
of the demand side of the economy. Hopkins prevailed, and went on to 
run the WPA. Of the $61 per worker the WPA spent each month, 76 
percent went to wages, while only about 18 percent went to materials. 
Furthermore, of that $61, only $2 (or about 3 percent) went to a rela 
tively small administrative staff of 30,000. (See Briscoe 1972).
At its zenith, the WPA employed 31 percent of the unemployed, a 
figure unprecedented to date. Approximately two million families were 
provided with $1.4 billion per year for six years, or approximately $10
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billion per year in today's dollars. And while it was obviously of psy 
chological benefit to a country reeling under the weight of massive 
unemployment, the longer-term impact of the WPA as an economic 
stimulus is harder to discern. For, of course, it was not the WPA, or any 
other New Deal social program, that brought the country out of reces 
sion; it was a war economy that finally spurred production and brought 
the nation back to full employment. Therefore, while the WPA undeni 
ably provided temporary relief for many, its longer-term impacts are 
difficult to assess.
One way to measure its impact is to return to the Hopkins-Ickes 
debate. Ironically, what the WPA is most recognized for today is the 
lasting contribution made through WPA-sponsored projects: 651,000 
miles of roads, 24,000 bridges and viaducts, 120,000 buildings, and 
countless aesthetic and artistic projects. Some would argue, therefore 
that it was precisely the WPA's contribution to the nation's infrastruc 
ture that laid the groundwork for the postwar economic boom. (See 
Noah 1982; Simon 1988). Bringing back WPA-type projects, they sug 
gest, would not only put significant numbers back to work, but would 
also put the economy in a position to keep workers employed in the 
future. A highway built today, for example, has a multiplying job cre 
ation effect in the future, not only employing maintenance crews and 
toll operators, but also attracting various service industries such as gas 
stations and fast food restaurants.
Several factors, however, make the WPA experience less than appo 
site for today's economy. Obviously, the Great Depression was a 
unique time, with unemployment rates reaching 25 percent. The bulk 
of the WPA workforce were white male family heads who had worked 
before and came to their jobs with basic skills. Labor unions were only 
just achieving respectability under the protection of the Wagner Act, 
and the idea of large numbers of government workers being organized 
in public employee unions was not even on the horizon. So concerns 
about public worker displacement were muted. Finally, since the WPA 
was aimed at putting large numbers back to work fast, the majority of 
projects were low-skill construction projects with minimal training 
value or skills requirements.
In sum, the WPA experience surely belies the conventional wisdom 
that government, and especially the federal government, is unable to 
undertake large programs quickly and efficiently (but then again so
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does the Gulf War). While its short-term effects are difficult to mea 
sure, its long-term value for improving the nation's infrastructure can 
not be gainsaid. Yet, so much has changed in the economy and the 
nature of the workforce in the last three score years that, attempting to 
recreate a federally run WPA type of undertaking seems a far fetched 
dream, or nightmare, depending on one's political perspective. Much 
closer to home is the post-World War II experience with public sector 
job creation, PSE under CETA, the largest back-to-work strategy since 
the WPA.
Public Service Employment and CETA
An extension of President Nixon's experimental Public Employ 
ment Program (PEP) of the early 1970s, PSE grew from a modest pro 
gram within CETA with $370 million in 1973, to CETA's main 
component designed to combat both structural and cyclical unemploy 
ment with an annual budget of $4.1 billion in fiscal year 1979, again 
about $10 billion in today's dollars. Only two years later, in 1981, 
CETA was gutted by the Reagan administration, with little opposition. 
(See Cook, Adams, and Rawlins 1985)
PEP, inaugurated under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, 
after initial rejection, was endorsed by Nixon as an answer to recession 
and a growing unemployment rate of 6 percent. CETA, on the other 
hand, enacted once recession had ebbed, was originally concerned with 
structural unemployment. It was created amid fears of workers being 
displaced by automation and technology, a fear that had proved 
unfounded in the 1960s and would be again in the 1970s, but which 
appeared again threatening in the early 1990s. Almost immediately, 
however, an economic downturn and a steadily ascending unemploy 
ment rate changed the original plans, and another federal emergency 
was declared. This time, the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment 
Assistance Act of 1974 (EJUAA) established Title VI under CETA, 
which was explicitly countercyclical. Whereas eligibility under the 
original jobs program (Title II) was restricted to those underemployed 
or unemployed for at least 30 days, Title VI loosened eligibility to fif-
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teen days in areas of high unemployment then characterized as being 
7 percent or more.
In 1976, as the economy began to recover, and reacting to criticism 
that PSE was not counterstructural enough those being helped were 
those least in need of help, and the jobs being appropriated were 
merely displacing regular government jobs Congress passed the 
Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act. Under this legislation, fund 
ing for PSE was increased, but the program reverted back to a counter- 
structural focus by increasing eligibility standards to target the long- 
term unemployed. This time the structural issue was less about job loss 
due to automation and more directed toward those segments of the 
labor force without any skills and with limited work histories. This was 
a much more disadvantaged population and had a much larger minority 
cast, as large numbers of unskilled blacks, forced off the land by the 
civil rights struggle and the agricultural revolution, were again migrat 
ing from the rural South in search of economic security in the nation's 
urban centers.
To discourage displacement, these new workers were to participate 
in new projects set up by administrators outside of regular government. 
President Carter's first years revealed a heightened financial commit 
ment to PSE, and by 1977, enrollment reached a peak of 750,000. But 
this flood of money had negative repercussions for CETA's image, 
which was irreparably tarnished by accusations in the popular press 
and media of widespread abuse and fraud. These accusations, coupled 
with the fear of many economists and labor union leaders, that CETA 
was still displacing workers and was little more than an inefficient rev 
enue-sharing program, prompted the federal government to act once 
again. In 1978, Congress beefed up restrictions for the last time, 
severely tightening eligibility criteria, placing limits on how long PSE 
workers could remain on the payroll, and placing ceilings on how 
much workers could earn. But from a public and political perspective, 
these changes were too little too late. Ronald Reagan campaigned 
mightily against this great "boondoggle," and by 1981, PSE and CETA 
were totally dismantled.
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Lessons from Public Service Job Creation Under CETA
The thumbnail history of public sector job creation set forth above 
contains several closely related questions that are at the heart of any 
analysis of public sector job creation: Should a program help the struc 
turally unemployed or those who are more "employable" but experi 
encing hard times? If the focus of such a program is designed to 
alleviate the burdens of recession, and is therefore a countercyclical 
program, can the displacement of local government workers be 
avoided? Should displacement be avoided, or because of its revenue- 
sharing effects, should it somehow be factored in as an economic bene 
fit for locally strapped governments facing their own budget crises? 
Similarly, if the focus of public sector job creation should be on com 
bating structural unemployment, can the low-wage, low-skill jobs that 
are inevitably provided to the structurally unemployed prove viable 
training grounds for workers hoping to someday make the transition to 
unsubsidized employment? The debate as to whether PSE was to be a 
countercyclical or counterstructural program is seen by many to be at 
the crux of any discussion of the viability of public jobs programs. For 
it is precisely the lack of a focused vision on this issue that eventually 
made PSE under CETA a political impossibility. (See Nathan, Cook, 
and Rawlins 1981; Baumer and Van Horn 1985.)
There were three distinct periods in the life of PSE under CETA 
that provide a framework to view its success and failure. (Cook, 
Adams, and Rawlins 1985, pp 46-49). The first, beginning with PEP 
and extending through the first three years of CETA, is defined by lax 
eligibility requirements, decentralized state and local administrations, 
and service-oriented employment programs.
The second period, from 1976 to 1978, was characterized by 
increasing demands from the federal government that PSE participants 
be disadvantaged, and that more emphasis be placed on training. Most 
commentators agree that during this period, enough of a balance was 
created between the service objectives of local governments and the 
federal emphasis on combating structural unemployment, that this was 
a relatively successful period for PSE. While the federal government 
was intent on targeting the most severely disadvantaged populations in 
order to combat structural unemployment, local administrators were
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primarily interested in implementing PSE programs in ways that were 
beneficial to their communities, in terms of relieving fiscal pressures, 
creating needed community service jobs, and relieving the social ills 
associated with unemployment. State and local officials implementing 
PSE programs, guided both by federal guidelines and their own inter 
ests, hired workers who had enough skill to be placed in community 
service jobs with minimal training, and at the same time avoided hiring 
higher-skilled and educated workers in an effort to remain faithful to 
federal objectives of employing the disadvantaged.
The third period, characterized by heightened federal restrictions on 
eligibility, upset this precarious policy balance. State and local govern 
ments were unable and unwilling to employ the uneducated and 
unskilled in service jobs, and large numbers of workers were either 
passed on to nonprofit agencies or given token jobs of little service to 
the community.
The work of Nathan, Cook, and Rawlins makes a convincing argu 
ment that, as a countercyclical program, PSE was relatively effective, 
but as a structural program, it was doomed to failure. As Nathan said in 
a subsequent New York Times article,
The program was set up to be counter-cyclical...[but] when the 
1976-77 recession ended, supporters of the program....hit on help 
ing the disadvantaged....But state and local governments resisted 
the new requirements for selection and training. Because the 
CETA workers were hard to place and supervise and often lacked 
job experience, most were farmed out to nonprofit organizations 
that provided social and community services. Some organizations 
did work of marginal value. Such jobs for sex therapy clinics, 
experimental art and drama groups, yoga centers fed the critics. 
The result: the CETA program bit the dust. (Op. Ed. in New York 
Times, January 31, 1994)
Most others who have reviewed the PSE experience under CETA 
agree. Baumer and Van Horn (1985) point out that efforts to target the 
structurally unemployed through criteria such as lower wages and 
tougher eligibility requirements did change the composition of the PSE 
workforce, but program administrators lost sight of the programs them 
selves. "While everyone made sure that the right people were enrolled 
in programs, that no one was paid too much for a public service job, 
and that proper forms were completed...local program design and per-
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formance goals were often swept aside, and local political support for 
employment and training initiatives eroded" (p. 12).
Thus, the crucial component of PSE was the value of community 
service that employees were able to provide. As long as state and local 
administrators could focus on employing the cyclically unemployed, or 
those with some work experience, they were able and willing to put 
employees to good use. Why then, if PSE seemed to be an effective 
way to ease the burdens of recessionary unemployment, did the federal 
government revamp it to target the structurally unemployed? One 
answer lies in understanding some of the inherent organizational diffi 
culties in designing and implementing a countercyclical program.
In designing a countercyclical approach to jobs programs, one must 
take into account the time lag between actual program implementation 
and stimulation to the economy. Because employment trends generally 
trail behind other economic indicators in a recessionary economy, by 
the time the government and Congress are sparked into action by high 
unemployment levels, the economy may actually be on the rebound. 
Further delays inevitably result from political debate, authorization, 
and implementation. Under these circumstances, the countercyclical 
objective of targeting and hiring those temporarily out of work until the 
economy can support them is undermined. As Clifford Johnson has 
pointed out, this is precisely what happened under CETA as the federal 
government responded to the 1974-76 recession.
Although the national unemployment rate remained high in 1976 
and 1977, federal outlays for local public works projects and 
expanded public service employment did not add significant stim 
ulus to the national economy until more than 2.5 years after the 
trough of the business cycle. (Johnson 1985)
The obvious political repercussions resulted in heightened public 
pressure to restrict targeting to more disadvantaged segments of the 
population.
Another issue deserving of more attention than it has received is the 
issue of scale. PSE's problems under CETA did not become really 
apparent until its volume expanded suddenly during the Carter admin 
istration and the Labor Department began to put local governments 
under pressure to fill the emerging slots. When many recipients turned 
out to be of doubtful eligibility, the program's enemies had a field day.
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Would lessened ambition or slower expansion have achieved more 
acceptable results?
The other key problem associated with implementing a successful 
countercyclical employment program is the substitution of federal 
funds for state and local funds. Substitution can take place in a myriad 
of ways, but the most common and most obvious is the displacement of 
regular government workers, normally paid by state and local taxes, 
with federally funded public service employees. State and local gov 
ernments, many argue, are especially vulnerable to substitution in a 
recession as budgets become increasingly difficult to balance. A study 
conducted by William Mirengoff and Lester Rindler found that net job 
creation under CETA had a direct relationship to fiscal pressures faced 
by state and local governments. The governments facing the severest 
fiscal pressures were the least likely to see employment increases 
through PSE, while governments with few fiscal concerns had the 
highest rates of net job creation. These findings would seem to support 
critics of public sector job creation who claim that because of displace 
ment, such programs are little more than an inefficient kind of revenue- 
sharing. (See Mirengoff and Rindler 1978; see also, for example, 
"Why CETA is in Trouble" 1978; "How CETA Came to be a Four Let 
ter Word" 1978; and "Lotsa Buck, Little Bang" 1977).
But the displacement issue, which caused CETA much political 
grief among program opponents, is extremely difficult to analyze, and 
some who have examined it closely, such as Nathan, Cook, and Raw- 
lins, believe that it is, upon close scrutiny, "relatively insignificant." 
They found, for example that, "roughly one PSE worker in five was 
doing a job that would have been filled even if the local government 
had not received PSE money." Rather than displace local jobs with 
CETA workers, they found state and local governments either creating 
new projects or subcontracting jobs to outside agencies. Furthermore, 
it is important in assessing substitution not to confuse displacement 
with "program maintenance" the attempt by fiscally strapped state 
and local governments to save government services that without CETA 
funds would necessarily be eliminated.
Perhaps the most serious issue relating to countercyclical public 
service employment programs is how much net job creation is possible 
over the long run through the use of short- term public job creation 
programs set up during a contracting economy. For even if new jobs
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are being created temporarily, are these jobs merely training workers 
for jobs that in the best-case scenario are already filled and, in the 
worst-case scenario, will not otherwise exist? Optimistic studies found 
up to 94 percent of PSE dollars had a stimulating effect on the econ 
omy, through the paying of salaries and the stabilizing of taxes. How 
ever, neither the CETA nor the WPA experience cast much light on the 
real economic stimulus effect of such efforts (Johnson 1985, p. 32)
These issues, especially displacement, discussed above in the con 
text of countercyclical programs, also have implications for counter- 
structural job creation efforts. And CETA contains other lessons about 
public sector counterstructural job creation programs as well. These 
are especially important in light of the only serious discussion about 
public sector job creation currently extant that related to employing 
large numbers of welfare recipients in public sector jobs after two 
years on the welfare roles.
Perhaps the most obvious lesson to be learned from CETA is that 
local government can target the severely disadvantaged without great 
difficulty and create work for them. By 1980, as a result of tightened 
eligibility requirements for PSE participants (such as raising the 
required length of unemployment from ten days to fifteen weeks), 
increased restrictions on the length of time PSE participants could stay 
on the job, and lower ceilings on the amount of money workers could 
earn, 92 percent of PSE enrollees were found to be from low-income 
households with very limited work histories.
What is more problematic, however, is how well PSE was able to 
help the structurally unemployed beyond providing a small, temporary 
paycheck. While it can validly be argued that any job, regardless of its 
skill level, is valuable training for someone who has never held a job, 
research on the impact of CETA jobs programs on wage earning power 
finds no appreciable gains being made as a result of PSE participation. 
As Clifford Johnson (1985) concluded,
earnings data [regarding CETA] indicate that work experience 
alone is perceived by future employers as being of relatively little 
value and that marked improvements in the future employability 
of disadvantaged adults can be achieved only when work opportu 
nities are combined with meaningful education and training initia 
tives.
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Furthermore, the more eligibility criteria were tightened to reach the 
more disadvantaged, the more program managers perceived the work 
ers they were getting as being of extremely low productivity, and the 
more they tended to create jobs that had little substantive content, and 
to provide little supervision for its performance. For the participants, 
this tended to undercut the inherent value of the work experience itself. 
It also, of course, fed the public criticisms of make-work jobs and 
shiftless workers which eventually doomed PSE. Thus, while only giv 
ing large numbers of the structurally unemployed with little work his 
tory or skills a job might hold a whole host of societal benefits; in 
terms of getting people permanently off welfare and back into the 
employment sector, it was clearly not the answer.
The Western European Experience
Since World War II, Western Europe has not ventured into a massive 
public sector job creation effort like PSE. Of course, until the most 
recent recession, the growing economies of most of these countries 
were characterized by labor shortages and the importation of "guest 
workers" to meet labor demands. Many of these countries, such as 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have set up some 
relatively modest efforts directed at a specific subset of the population, 
such as youth, the disabled, or the aged. These programs usually incor 
porate a significant training element designed to upgrade worker skills. 
(See Balkenbol 1981; Karsten 1981). Others, such as Belgium and 
West Germany, have more broad-based job creation programs as an 
integral part of government fiscal policy, with triggers built into legis 
lation to spur increased public sector hiring when downturns in the 
economy raise unemployment rates." Programs in European countries 
also differ significantly from one country to another on issues such as 
private sector involvement, requirements for community benefits, and 
the duration of participation.
The Netherlands represents a fairly typical example of the variety of 
public sector job creation activities in a Western European country. 
Since 1977, the government has sponsored a temporary public sector 
jobs program for difficult-to-place unemployed. Temporary employ-
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ment for those unemployed for at least six months is provided for up to 
six months for those under age 45, and for up to a year for those over 
age 45. In 1979, the program was expanded to include nonprofit orga 
nizations as sponsors of worksites. In 1980, the government created a 
special temporary work agency to provide jobs for certain workers, pri 
marily youth, classified as having poor employment prospects. The 
government also has set up a Corporation for Industrial Projects to pro 
mote employment through the creation of industrial enterprises subsi 
dized by the government. Other countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and France have also focused their job creation efforts 
on economic development and community enterprise in order to create 
and subsidize businesses that will employ the unemployed.
In the 1980s, as recession created seriously higher unemployment 
rates in Western Europe for the first time in decades, some of the coun 
tries with targeted public sector employment programs began to 
expand their efforts. These expansions also were highly targeted 
towards specific structural employment problems. Thus Denmark, for 
example, began a public job creation program for handicapped work 
ers. By 1982, this effort had been considerably broadened with a spe 
cial emphasis on youth employment. Ireland, Greece, and the United 
Kingdom, are other countries that created public sector jobs programs 
primarily for unemployed young workers in the early 1980s. Other 
countries expanded existing programs targeted to youth. These pro 
grams generally were characterized as being relatively short-term up 
to six months on the job allowed with wages fixed at a fairly low rate 
to encourage transition. Often these programs try to link the job to eco 
nomic development, entrepreneurial, or other more permanent job cre 
ation activities. This is done, either directly through the program itself 
or indirectly through mandating linkages to other economic develop 
ment/job creation initiatives.
Generally, discussions in Western Europe about strategies for deal 
ing with structural and countercyclical employment problems mirror 
those in the United States. Issues about targeting, appropriate wage 
levels, program duration, and competition with the private sector 
appear to be the focus of most debates on public sector job creation. 
(See Bekemans 1983; Faulkner 1977). And in fact, most of these coun 
tries cite the United States experience with CETA's PSE program when 
denigrating the notion that public sector job creation can be a major
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part of a strategy to increase employment and retrain the workforce. 
(See Beharrell 1992).
Typically, Sweden appears to have the most comprehensive and suc 
cessful full-employment policy. Swedish labor exchanges, set up by 
the government to fill job vacancies, tightly regulate private industry by 
requiring all firms to notify them of job openings that are filled with 
apparent efficiency. Workers whose lack of skills prevent them from 
getting jobs through the labor exchanges are provided with intensive 
government-managed training or retraining, and 70 percent find jobs 
within six months of completion. For those who do not immediately 
find jobs through the training system or who may not qualify for such 
training, the government provides short-term work in "socially useful" 
types of jobs. These jobs pay prevailing wage, but are strictly time-lim 
ited, usually to ten months, and workers are encouraged to find private 
employment during this period. If a worker has not found an employ 
ment alternative by the conclusion of the time limit, support ceases.
These labor market policies are combined with other macroeco- 
nomic strategies designed to increase productivity, protect Swedish 
goods, and steady currency values. Critics claim that Sweden has 
traded off its policy to require a tight labor market with an unnecessar 
ily high inflation rate. But the country has been willing to make this 
trade-off to protect full employment, and preserve wage levels.
It is clear that the highly integrated and occasionally draconian mea 
sures Sweden has adopted would not be practical either politically or 
economically in a larger and more diverse economy such as the United 
States. And that nation's current economic and political problems 
reduce its motivational value. Nevertheless, the Swedish example does 
support those who would argue that governments can encourage fuller 
and more productive employment, and that public sector job creation 
has a legitimate role in this process.
Current Activities and Future Prospects
There is no likelihood of an effort to reintroduce public service job 
creation as a major instrument of public policy on the horizon, with 
one significant exception. That exception is for welfare recipients who,
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under various proposals for reform, will be subject to stringent time 
limitations for staying on welfare. For example, President Clinton's 
original two-year limitation with a job guarantee at the end is being 
tested on a demonstration basis in a number of states. Other states are 
struggling with various strategies to limit welfare and encourage or 
require some kind of job creation strategy to employ welfare recipients 
who are unable to find jobs on their own. And the federal intent is 
apparently to make welfare reform a state responsibility, with lessened 
federal dollars but without total hands off from federal restrictions.
Most commentators would agree that the reasons for a basic lack of 
policy interest are more political than substantive. The perception that 
this policy strategy was ineffective under CETA is firmly embedded in 
the public mind, regardless of the reality of what actually happened 
and why.
Liberal supporters of public job creation, such as the late Sar Levi- 
tan, are a voice in the wilderness when they argue that,
Jobs programs have made and can make a tangible difference in 
alleviating hardship, supplying valued services (including labor 
intensive public works), and promoting the work ethic. Past mis 
takes justify improving not abjuring future efforts. (Levitan 
and Gallo 1991)
As the above quotation indicates, even most supporters recognize 
that there are legitimate concerns with how public service employment 
has operated in the past. Their argument is that these problems can be 
corrected to make such a program more efficacious, and that the 
nation's most massive effort, WPA, was, in fact, highly efficient and 
effective.
Theoretically, there could be an opportunity to resurrect the good 
name of public job creation in current welfare reform efforts. Unfortu 
nately, the essentially punitive rationale imbedded in the various initia 
tives to restructure welfare almost certainly doom them to failure as a 
public service employment strategy. Even at its most stringent, PSE 
and more targeted European initiatives make six months the minimum 
that a person must be out of work before qualifying. Yet, most pro 
posed welfare reform strategies make such jobs available only to those 
who are unable or unwilling to find regular employment within a mini 
mum two-year or five-year period while they are on welfare. This
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makes it likely that the population that will eventually come to public 
service jobs will be the least prepared to function effectively in the 
labor market. As the CETA experience illustrates, public sector job cre 
ation began to fall apart when it became a structural strategy designed 
to target the most difficult to employ. This made the creation of legiti 
mate jobs most difficult and led program managers to search for ways 
to put people in jobs with little supervision and little substantive con 
tent so as not to detract from the primary missions.
The lessons from WPA and CETA should show that unemployment 
is not a single problem with a single solution. Individual strategies tar 
geting specific populations have succeeded over the years, and in fact, 
a substantive body of knowledge exists that can provide guidance to 
policy makers on how to design an effective program. Cyclical unem 
ployment can be responsive to publicly created jobs that either fill a 
service void that can be tailored to meet local needs or can be targeted 
to large- scale public works projects such as those most remembered 
from the WPA. These jobs can work because the population targeted 
for this type of program have a demonstrated work history and they 
understand the rigors of the working routine. They may need some 
retraining or orientation to a new job, but they are accustomed to work. 
However, these are not the people for whom jobs would be created 
under current proposals.
Lessons have also taught that the hardest nut to crack, the long-term 
welfare recipient, the most unemployable segment of society includ 
ing those who lack work experience, education, or work skills cannot 
be helped by just providing a job. Many can, however, be helped by 
training, remedial education, or a job that has been restructured to 
manageable size, in which essential close supervision is provided. 
Unfortunately, therefore, the very populations that are likely to be tar 
geted for public service employment under current welfare reform ini 
tiatives are those who will continue to give public service job creation 
a bad name because of the lack of thought being given to overcoming 
their job disabilities in conjunction with the job creation effort.
Exacerbating this problem are provisions in some proposals for wel 
fare reform that require prevailing wages to be paid when jobs are cre 
ated that parallel the job content of existing positions. This 
requirement, made in response to labor union pressures and concerns 
about possible displacement effects, will further likely reduce job con-
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tent and supervision for most of those who would be required to partic 
ipate.
Finally, because the population will be almost entirely female, the 
types of jobs will be limited. Efforts to create opportunities for women 
in nontraditional employment such as construction have been mostly 
unsuccessful, in large part because most women are not interested in 
performing such work. Thus low-skill, labor-intensive infrastructure 
building projects, which characterized WPA at its best, would not be a 
significant part of such public sector job creation efforts. To add con 
tent to welfare reform plans would require significant expenditures in 
areas of training, supervision, and management expenditures that are 
highly unlikely, given current budget stringencies.
In sum, unless significant changes are made in current proposals 
under the welfare reform rubric, public sector job creation, in and of 
itself, is unlikely to be a successful strategy to secure longer-term, non- 
subsidized employment for those who are forced to participate. And, to 
the extent it is used as a strategy, it is likely to be viewed by the public 
primarily as a make-work effort designed as a less obnoxious, more 
equitable alternative to long-term welfare dependency.
In addition to welfare reform, there are a few relatively modest 
demonstration projects recently launched by the federal government 
that encompass principles of public sector job creation, although not 
advertised as such. These projects are directed at youth, with the most 
notable being YouthBuild, sponsored by the U. S. Department of Hous 
ing and Urban Development, and Youth Fair Chance, sponsored by the 
U. S. Department of Labor. Each is being operated in twenty to thirty 
competitively selected communities across the country. As of the fall of 
1995, YouthBuild has survived federal budget cutting, but Youth Fair 
Chance has been zeroed out in FY 1996.
YouthBuild is designed to give poor youth training and work experi 
ence in the construction trades, primarily through the rehabilitation of 
housing stock in poor neighborhoods (where there is little labor union 
interest). The program is carried out by nonprofit sponsors who are 
allowed to pay the youths at the minimum wage as part of the work 
experience phase of the demonstration. It appears similar in many 
respects to a number of programs of community rebuilding and short- 
term job creation that are being carried out in Western European coun 
tries. Youth Fair Chance, a more comprehensive youth training and
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employment demonstration, also includes a work experience compo 
nent where youth are allowed to receive a weekly "stipend" of up to 
$100 while carrying out any of a variety of locally selected work activ 
ities (the normal allowable Labor Department training stipend is $30). 
These examples indicate that the concept of public sector employment, 
when dealing with structural employment problems, if packaged and 
marketed creatively, can still garner support, although certainly not, at 
present, on a large scale.
Thus, building up experience with effective employment strategies 
that focus on both structural and countercyclical problems and include 
a public sector job creation component would certainly seem feasible 
and useful as long as the public sector component is targeted at the 
population that can benefit from it and structured in a way to be useful 
to the community at large. The components of such a strategy should 
focus on building understanding and effectiveness around a number of 
issues that would need to be resolved, if such programs are to regain 
the confidence of the public. In his work on public sector job creation, 
Sar Levitan pointed out many of the areas that would be critical to suc 
cess. Included are:
1. Defining each segment of the population to be targeted and devel 
oping an appropriate strategy for each, including eligibility stan 
dards and wage levels
2. Structuring the jobs that are created to maximize content and 
minimize the likelihood of substitution
3. Adjusting the level of supervision and other support services 
required to maximize the value of the job for participants and 
sponsoring agencies
4. Establishing the right sequence and mix of work experience and 
training or re- training and the duration of program participation 
necessary to provide real long-term opportunities for participants
Without attempting to be definitive, as examples of how the above 
requirements could be implemented, a two-tier system might be cre 
ated. For persons with little or no work history, emphasis would be 
placed on learning how to function in the workplace. Duration would 
be limited to one year. Jobs would be low-skill and entry-level, with
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close supervision. Wages would be at or near the minimum wage. 
Opportunities for remedial education and skills training through class 
room instruction would be included for the first six months, so that 
actual time on the job might be limited to twenty hours per week. 
Opportunities for advancement to higher skill levels and higher wages 
would be afforded after six months of successful participation.
For persons with significant prior work experience and/or higher 
education levels who had been out of work for at least six months, the 
emphasis would be on training or retraining through on- the-job work 
experience. Jobs would be of a higher skill content, wages would be set 
at 80 percent of the prevailing wage for similar occupational categories 
up to $10 per hour, and duration would be limited to six months. Job 
creation would focus on occupations where there were significant 
opportunities for achieving permanent placement in either the private 
or public sector.
Experiments in public sector job creation to refine program tech 
niques and develop a stronger knowledge base need not be large-scale 
efforts. Given the current willingness of numerous state and local juris 
dictions to develop new strategies for dealing with issues of unemploy 
ment, it is likely that support could be found for a series of modest 
efforts to enhance learning about what works and what doesn't in tar 
geting the structurally unemployed. Perhaps building on the experience 
of several European community development/job creation strategies 
and the opportunities afforded by recent federal enterprise and empow 
erment zone legislation, projects could be developed which would 
more directly link economic development efforts to short-term public 
sector job creation strategies involving both government and not-for- 
profit organizations as program sponsors. Such projects could be tar 
geted at population groups with specific needs, such as youth and wel 
fare recipients, or geographically, as in depressed areas with histories 
of long-term and continuous levels of high unemployment.
If the federal government could be persuaded to reenter the field, 
programs could also focus on cyclical issues by tying short-term public 
service to unemployment insurance, and by focusing initiatives in 
areas of high worker displacement brought about by government poli 
cies such as the downsizing of defense industries, base closings, or fed 
eral regulations such as those related to environmental protection.
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To recapture public and political support, it would be advisable to 
assure that any experiments that were developed would include a mix 
of populations that included both workers with basic skills such as 
those employed through the WPA, and workers with more serious 
employment disabilities such as those targeted in the last days of 
CETA and PSE.
Public sector job creation has proved to be a valuable tool in the past 
in providing work experience, training, and retraining. It has helped to 
build and rebuild the country's infrastructure, and provided useful gov 
ernment services. At least among state and local governments search 
ing for new strategies under the impetus of federal block grant plans, it 
would appear to be an opportune time to once again take a page from 
past experiences and begin the process of developing new strategies for 
using public sector job creation as a technique for dealing with the seri 
ous dislocations that are going to continue to confront so many trying 
to make it in the workforce
Sar Levitan frequently reiterated the view that a PSE program of 
some size should be a permanent component of the portfolio of 
employment and training programs. Obviously we need to experiment 
and know much more before adopting that as general policy. But for 
now the issue is obviously politically moot.
This paper is an updated version of a report originally prepared for 
the Pew Charitable Trusts. The author wishes to acknowledge the assis 
tance of Joshua Grinker, who carried out a substantial amount of the 
historical research and analysis of the WPA, CETA, and European 
experiences; and Suzanne Trazoff, who provided a valuable critique 
and edited the earlier version. The Paper itself and its findings and con 
clusions are solely the responsibility of the author.
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